High Leverage Interventions
In the November-December, 2010 issue of Operations Research, David Lane of the London School of Economics and Political Science examines three historical uses of operations research. He has two goals in this exercise:
This paper has two aims. First, to present cases in which scientists developed a defensive system for their homeland: Blackett and the air defense of Britain in WWII, Forrester and the SAGE system for North America in the Cold War, and Archimedes’ work defending Syracuse during the Second Punic War. In each case the historical context and the individual’s other achievements are outlined, and a description of the contribution’s relationship to OR/MS is given.
The second aim is to consider some of the features the cases share and examine them in terms of contemporary OR/MS methodology. Particular reference is made to a recent analysis of the field’s strengths and weaknesses. This allows both a critical appraisal of the field and a set of potential responses for strengthening it. Although a mixed set of lessons arise, the overall conclusion is that the cases are examples to build on and that OR/MS retains the ability to do high stakes work.
The examples Lane outlines are truly important ones: if any of Blacket, Forrester or (much earlier) Archimedes had failed in their activities, the world would be a much different place. And all used methods that are clearly operations research, even if some of the activities predated any field by that name. So the article clearly outline interesting history. But do these stories provide any guidance for the future? As Aristotle said: “If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development”. Can we understand operations research and its future better through understanding this history?
Lane argues that we can, and points to a number of common features of the three cases. First is the interdisciplinary nature of the work, with none of the major actors having training in the area they were affecting. Second is emphasis on practicality in applying theory to problems in the real world. Third is the systems approach to problem solving, going beyond an understanding of individual parts to understanding the full sytem. The final aspect is the access to high level decision makers. All of these are aspects of the best aspects of operations research. By understanding these themes, those working in operations research today can, perhaps, be more effective.
The full paper is available here:
High Leverage Interventions by David Lane
.
The editors of Operations Research have invited two commentaries on this paper. The first comes from Alan Washburn, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Washburn is a leading researcher in the area of military applications of operations research and is a member of the National Academy of Engineering. In his commentary, Dr. Washburn focuses on a number of challenges our field faces. Going back to work by Morse and Kimball in 1951, Dr. Washburn notes one fundamental tension:
Here we have the first mention of the dichotomy that still haunts our profession:
we are the advisor-scientists, and a separate administrator (officer/client/sponsor/executive) is the
person actually responsible for making decisions.
From the beginning, our field has faced the issue of how to have impact.
Dr. Washburn’s full commentary is available here:
Washburn Commentary
.
The second commentary comes from Dr. ManMohan Sodhi and Dr. Chris Tang. Sodhi and Tang are authors of a previous OR Forum paper on The OR/MS Ecosystem: Stengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. Sodhi and Tang stress that there is no shortage of examples of high leverage interventions in operations research: work such as that done for the Edelman Prize makes that abundantly clear. The question is more “Why aren’t there more?”. Sodhi and Tang note that Lane’s examples, coming from military applications, may not address issues in the business world:
But what about the business school and even the business world
at large? A critic may question the relevance of OR/MS to the business school (in contrast to
engineering) and argue that all three cases would apply to (applied) physics or engineering so why
don’t OR/MS academics go and become successful somewhere else instead?
Sohi and Tang’s full commentary is available here:
Sodhi and Tang’s commentary
.
This issue of how to have impact for our field is an important one. Lane argues that we learn a lot from a close examination of three historical cases. What do you think? What are the key drivers that lead to success? How can our field have more successes?


Posted by Jonathan Rosenhead on 12/31/1969 at 12:28 pm