High Leverage Interventions

In the November-December, 2010 issue of Operations Research, David Lane of the London School of Economics and Political Science examines three historical uses of operations research. He has two goals in this exercise:

"

This paper has two aims. First, to present cases in which scientists developed a defensive system for their homeland: Blackett and the air defense of Britain in WWII, Forrester and the SAGE system for North America in the Cold War, and Archimedes’ work defending Syracuse during the Second Punic War. In each case the historical context and the individual’s other achievements are outlined, and a description of the contribution’s relationship to OR/MS is given.

The second aim is to consider some of the features the cases share and examine them in terms of contemporary OR/MS methodology. Particular reference is made to a recent analysis of the field’s strengths and weaknesses. This allows both a critical appraisal of the field and a set of potential responses for strengthening it. Although a mixed set of lessons arise, the overall conclusion is that the cases are examples to build on and that OR/MS retains the ability to do high stakes work.

"

The examples Lane outlines are truly important ones: if any of Blacket, Forrester or (much earlier) Archimedes had failed in their activities, the world would be a much different place. And all used methods that are clearly operations research, even if some of the activities predated any field by that name. So the article clearly outline interesting history. But do these stories provide any guidance for the future? As Aristotle said: “If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development”. Can we understand operations research and its future better through understanding this history?

Lane argues that we can, and points to a number of common features of the three cases. First is the interdisciplinary nature of the work, with none of the major actors having training in the area they were affecting. Second is emphasis on practicality in applying theory to problems in the real world. Third is the systems approach to problem solving, going beyond an understanding of individual parts to understanding the full sytem. The final aspect is the access to high level decision makers. All of these are aspects of the best aspects of operations research. By understanding these themes, those working in operations research today can, perhaps, be more effective.

The full paper is available here: pdf High Leverage Interventions by David Lane .

The editors of Operations Research have invited two commentaries on this paper. The first comes from Alan Washburn, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Washburn is a leading researcher in the area of military applications of operations research and is a member of the National Academy of Engineering. In his commentary, Dr. Washburn focuses on a number of challenges our field faces. Going back to work by Morse and Kimball in 1951, Dr. Washburn notes one fundamental tension:

"

Here we have the first mention of the dichotomy that still haunts our profession:
we are the advisor-scientists, and a separate administrator (officer/client/sponsor/executive) is the
person actually responsible for making decisions.

"

From the beginning, our field has faced the issue of how to have impact.

Dr. Washburn’s full commentary is available here: pdf Washburn Commentary .

The second commentary comes from Dr. ManMohan Sodhi and Dr. Chris Tang. Sodhi and Tang are authors of a previous OR Forum paper on The OR/MS Ecosystem: Stengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. Sodhi and Tang stress that there is no shortage of examples of high leverage interventions in operations research: work such as that done for the Edelman Prize makes that abundantly clear. The question is more “Why aren’t there more?”. Sodhi and Tang note that Lane’s examples, coming from military applications, may not address issues in the business world:

"

But what about the business school and even the business world
at large? A critic may question the relevance of OR/MS to the business school (in contrast to
engineering) and argue that all three cases would apply to (applied) physics or engineering so why
don’t OR/MS academics go and become successful somewhere else instead?

"

Sohi and Tang’s full commentary is available here: pdf Sodhi and Tang’s commentary .

This issue of how to have impact for our field is an important one. Lane argues that we learn a lot from a close examination of three historical cases. What do you think? What are the key drivers that lead to success? How can our field have more successes?

Comments

The implications of David Lane’s interesting and provocative paper have by no means been exhausted by the commissioned commentaries by Washburn and by Sodhi and Tang.

I have a number of minor issues with some of the things they say, or don’t say, about Blackett, one of Lane’s 3 trail-blazers, which I will append at the end of these remarks. But the main point I want to make relates to the analyst/client distinction so usefully highlighted by Washburn. He sees the gulf of mutual comprehension and trust between them as a significant impediment to ‘high leverage’ OR interventions of the kind Lane wrote about. In effect Washburn then says that we clearly cannot teach OR students to be context-aware, since the contexts they may work in are so various; so perhaps we should instead try to teach budding executives to understand the basics of OR/MS.

There is a third alternative – to make the production of analysis-based decisions a joint enterprise between clients and analysts. Each partner can then contribute from their own particular knowledge base and expertise. There is a historical precedent for this: the very close collaborative relationship they achieved has been credited as one of the key factors in the success of the World War 2 OR in Britain. Indeed Solly (later Lord) Zuckerman went so far as to describe OR as ‘the bastard born out of a secret liaison of scientists and airmen’ (Zuckerman, 1964, p 287). Such prolonged intimacy may not normally be possible away from the pressure cooker of wartime circumstances. However we can perhaps approximate it for limited periods.

This is indeed one way of describing what happens in a well-run ‘soft OR’ (or Problem Structuring Methods) workshop. The mutual engagement of client and executive is promoted by the transparent, model-based forms of analysis which are deployed, and by the participative process. These enable the development of a mutual understanding and trust which give the client/executive confidence both in her analytic helper and in the results that have been achieved.

In purely technical problems, of course, such a relationship is not required – but high leverage interventions are never purely technical.

Sodhi and Tang accept the relevance of ‘Soft OR’ to the sort of higher profile OR interventions that Lane is arguing for. But they fear that even mentioning it “generates a rather visceral and negative reaction” not least among journal editors. This journal is not excluded – see OR/MS Today for an article, a letter to the editor, and an editorial on the subject (Mingers 2009; Ackermann et al 2009; Horner 2009). Sodhi and Tang appear to think that Lane steered clear of this issue. Not really – there is an extensive treatment, though phrases such as “modelling tools and approaches appropriate for more sociotechnical situations” are used in place of ‘soft OR’. How will the OR community make progress in its professional deliberations unless members feel they can speak and write openly?

Ah yes, those detailed issues:
i) Washburn states that Morse and Kimball’s historic text (1951) was “the first mention of the dichotomy [between analyst and client] that haunts our profession”. In fact this distinction is integral to the very first OR document – Blackett’s (1941) ‘Scientists at the operational level’ written in the heat of OR’s genesis.
ii) Sodhi and Tang say that “Blackett has some claim to be the father of OR”, but go on to equate his claim to that of Babbage in the 19th century. The significant difference is that Blackett set up and led a series of groups explicitly dedicated to the practice of OR across the three armed services, and was responsible for a whole series of projects triumphantly brought off. Not only that, the current professional practice of OR derives directly and continuously from the work that Blackett (and other contemporaneous scientists) carried out. Some claim!

Ackermann , F. and 46 others (2009) ‘The case for soft OR’, OR/MS Today, April 2009, 20.
Blackett, P.M.S. (1941) Scientists at the Operational Level, Admiralty, London.
Horner, P. (2009) ‘Hard sell for soft OR’, OR/MS Today, April 2009, 4.
Mingers, J. (2009) ‘Taming hard problems with soft OR’, OR/MS Today, April 2009, 48-53.
Zuckerman, S. (1964). ‘In the beginning—and later’, Opl Res Q 15: 287–292.

About the Blog

The OR Forum is an area of the journal Operations Research, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). The purpose of the Forum area is spelled out in its mission statement:

"

The purpose of the OR Forum area is to stimulate discussion about the field of Operations Research and interesting new research challenges. The OR Forum area invites thought-provoking work that challenges the reader to reconsider and revaluate past research streams as well as to consider new emerging areas of research. Analysis of prospects in areas not traditionally covered by Operations Research are strongly encouraged, as are provocative papers that take a strong stand on policy issues. Possible submissions may also include critical reviews of research in a specialized field and closely reasoned commentary on the practice within an area. The work should be accessible and of interest to a significant portion of the readership of Operations Research.

Published work will often be accompanied by supplemental commentary that enhance or dispute the theses developed and an online forum will provide opportunity to continue the discussion after publication. Authors are encouraged to contact the Area Editor early in the process of developing their work to determine suitability for consideration in this area. The Area Editor will seek nominations from the other Area Editors at Operations Research to identify suitable papers to be published and discussed in the OR Forum from among those manuscripts already through the standard review process.

"

This site is an adjunct to the published papers in the journal. At this site, we invite commentary and discussion of each of the OR Forum’s papers. There is no set time-limit to this discussion, and interested readers are invited to check back periodically for updates.

All comments and posts are moderated for content by the Area Editor, Edieal Pinker (ed.pinker@simon.rochester.edu) .

Welcome to the OR Forum!

Recent Posts

Tag cloud