Michael B. Maschler

July 22, 1927 – July 20, 2008

Brief Biography

Born in Jerusalem, Michael B. Maschler was a Frederick W. Lanchester Prize recipient. He received his PhD from the Hebrew University in 1956 under the supervision of Stefan Bergman and Michael Fekete. Upon completing his dissertation, Maschler joined the university faculty. He soon after met with a newly recruited lecturer, Robert J. Aumann, who had recently graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Auman played a major role in “converting” Maschler into a game theorist. The duo went onto to form a close working collaboration that spanned decades and produced some of the most important contributions to game theory.

In the early 1960s, both Maschler and Aumann visited the United States as research associates at the Econometric Research Program at Princeton University, having the opportunity to work alongside leading American game theorists. Later on, they were members of a specialist group that advised the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmenent Agency (ACDA) in Washington, DC, helping originate the theory of games with incomplete information. This led to Maschler’s influential work in cooperative game theory, a subject which became a focal point of his career. Another bi-product of his ACDA tenure led to important developed to the inspection games theory.

In the 1970s, Maschler and Aumann coauthored a Management Science article on the minimax principle. Maschler’s lecture notes from this period were published at numerous internationally renowned universities, reflecting their global influence. His collaborative work continued throughout the next three decades, working closely with John von Neumann Theory Prize recipient, Lloyd S. Shapley, and Econometric Society Fellow Bezalel Peleg.

Maschler and Aumann were jointly awarded the 1995 Frederick W. Lanchester Prize for their book, Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. Incorporating their previous work spanning decades, Repeated Games was honored as a landmark contribution to the theory on relationships between rational decision makers. Maschler and Aumann employed an attractive blend of deep and subtle mathematics, all while offering serious and tangible application possibilities.

Maschler was an active figure in the Israel educational system, chairing curriculum committees for mathematics in elementary, middle and high schools across the nation. He published books in both Hebrew and English, allowing for his influence to be felt by game theorists across borders. At the time of his death, he was a professor in the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University.

Other Biographies

Wikipedia Entry for Michael Maschler


Hebrew University of Jerusalem, PhD 1956 (Mathematics Genealogy)


Academic Affiliations
Non-Academic Affiliations
  • US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Key Interests in OR/MS



Zamir S. (2008) Discussion Paper #493: In Memoriam for Michael B. Maschler. Hebrew University of Jerusalem Center for the Study of Rationality: Jerusalem. (link)

Awards and Honors

Frederick W. Lanchester Prize 1995

Selected Publications

Aumann R. J. & Maschler M. B. (1964) The bargaining set for cooperative games. Drescher M., Shapley L. S., & Tucker A. W., eds in Advances in Game Theory, 443-476. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.

Davis M. & Maschler M. B. (1965) The core of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly

Aumann R. J. & Maschler M. B. (1966) Game theoretic aspects of gradual disarmament. Report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 80: 1-55. ACDA: Washington, DC.

Aumann R. J. & Maschler M. B. (1972) Some thoughts on the minimax principle. Management Science, 18(5b): 54-63.

Maschler M. B. (1976) An advantage of the bargaining set over the core. Journal of Economic Theory, 13(2): 184-192.

Maschler M. B., Peleg B., & Shapley L. S. (1979) Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus and related solution concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 4(4): 303-338.

Perles P. M. & Maschler M. B. (1981) The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game. International Journal of Game Theory, 10(3-4): 163-193.

Aumann R. J. & Maschler M. B. (1985) Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory, 36(2): 195-213.

Maschler M. B. (1992) The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus. Aumann R. J. & Hart S., eds. in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Chapter 18. Elsevier: Amsterdam.

Aumann R. J. & Maschler M. B. (1995) Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 

Additional Resources

The Michael B. Maschler Prize. In Memory of Michael B. Maschler. Accessed June 16, 2015. (link)