DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality

Event Detail

General Information
Monday, January 31, 2005 - Tuesday, February 1, 2005
Days of Week:
Target Audience:
Academic and Practice
Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Event Details/Other Comments:

Traditionally, economists and game theorists have assumed that strategic agents are fully rational but in the last few decades a number of game theorists have argued that human players do not behave in a way consistent with theoretical predictions. Questions have been raised regarding the postulate of full rationality and some have proposed formalizations of partially or boundedly rational players and games played by such players. If one takes the view that a process of decision-making in economic or other social situations constitutes computation in a formal sense of theoretical computer science, then one is naturally led to some notion of bounded computational power as a formal expression of bounded rationality. Two important and complementary questions in this line of inquiry are (1) What is the computational power required in order to play a game in a way consistent with full rationality? (2) If players are limited in their computational power, how different will equilibrium outcomes be from the fully rational case? This workshop will bring together economists and game theorists interested in bounded rationality, as well as theoretical computer scientists with experience in limited computational models.
Topics of interest include:
* Bounded recall and bounded complexity in repeated games
* Strategic aspects of machine learning
* Game theoretic applications of cryptography